Illinois Wesleyan University
From the SelectedWorks of James Dougan

November, 1994

<em>Gallistel’s</em> The Organization of
Learning: This <em>is</em> Not <em>Creation
Science</em>
James Dougan, Illinois Wesleyan University

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/james_dougan/12/

1994, 62, 435-444

JOURNAL OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR

NUMBER

3

(NOVEMBER)

CALLISTEL'S THE ORGANIZATION OF LEARNING:
THIS IS NOT CREATION SCIENCE
JAMES D. DOUGAN
ILLINOIS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

After almost a century and a half, evolution is
still not widely understood. It is vigorously opposed by defenders of a creator. As a result, it
is still impossible to teach biology properly in
many American schools. A creation science has
been proposed to be taught in its place. The
role of variation and selection in the behavior
of the individual suffers from the same opposition. Cognitive science is the creation science
of psychology, as it struggles to maintain the
position of a mind or self. (Skinner, 1990, p.
1209)
One might expect that the experimental study
of learning by psychologists would serve to clarify just what representations different animals
can and cannot compute and something about
the nature of the computations by which the
animals derive these representations. By and
large, one would be disappointed in this expectation because experimental psychologists
do not generally view the phenomena of learning within a representational framework. It is
my purpose to argue that they should. (Gallistel, 1990, pp. 2-3)

It is probably reasonable to predict that few
behavior analysts (or evolutionary biologists,
for that matter) spend time reading the creation science literature. The reasons are obvious: Creation "science" is in fact antiscientific
and anti-intellectual, and there is little to gain
from the study of such materials. I must confess
a worry that the adamant Skinnerian will reject Gallistel's (1990) The Organization of
Learning for similar reasons. The book is unapologetically cognitivist in its approach, and
Skinner's final proclamations against cognitive
science might lead the behavior analyst to re-

ject the book before even reading it. This would
be a mistake, because The Organization of
Learning is not creation science. It is an intelligent and quite fascinating survey of nonhuman animal learning. At the very least, the
reader will learn about diverse, interesting,
and probably unfamiliar literatures. The careful reader may even gain new insights into
learning processes-insights that could lead to
new and profitable lines of research.
This is not to suggest that the behavior analyst should agree with everything Gallistel
writes. On the contrary, the behavior analyst
will probably want to disagree with a goodly
portion of the book. More specifically, Gallistel's opinions on the definition and scope of
learning, on the role of theory, and on the
generality of behavioral principles will probably be disagreeable to many behavior analysts. We often learn more, however, from listening to people with whom we disagree,
because such people challenge our preconceptions and force us to reevaluate our conceptual
systems. Gallistel's book certainly accomplishes this.
The present review, therefore, will concentrate on those ideas that are most foreign to a
behavior-analytic approach. First, however, it
is necessary to outline Gallistel's theory of
learning, because the theory forms the backbone around which the remainder of the book
is organized.
The Basic Theory
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An animal's nervous system constructs representations of behavior-relevant aspects of the
animal's environment as a means of adapting
the animal's behavior to that environment.
These constructions are representations in the
mathematical sense of the term; there is a formal isomorphism between entities and processes within the nervous system and selected
aspects of the external world. The isomorphism
is not fortuitous; the entities and processes in
the nervous system isomorphic to selected aspects of the external world play a causal role
in generating behavior adapted to those same

436

JAMES D. DOUGAN

external aspects. The isomorphism between the
internal and external systems is the key to the
success of the internal system in carrying out
its function. (Gallistel, 1990, p. 475)

The Organization of Learning simultaneously operates on several levels. On one level,
the book represents an attempt to summarize
and organize a massive and diverse literature.
On another level, the book serves as a program
for future research, pointing to what Gallistel
thinks are interesting and important areas of
study. The third level is theoretical. Gallistel's
theory of learning is both cognitivist and neurological. The theory is cognitivist because it
invokes abstract representational systems as
explanatory concepts. The theory is neurological because, unlike some cognitivist theories,
the abstract representational systems are taken
to represent actual neurological structures that
in some cases have even been identified.
According to Gallistel, the basic process in
learning is the formation of neurological representations of the environment. As noted in
the above quote, the representations are assumed to be formally isomorphic with the external world. Here the term isomorphism is
used in its purely mathematical sense. Specifically, an isomorphism
exists when there is a procedure that maps entities, relations, and operations in the represented system into entities, relations, and operations in the representing system in such a
way that two or more entities within the represented system are related in a given way if
and only if... there is a corresponding relation
between their representatives in the representing system. (Gallistel, 1990, p. 16)

To give an example, if Line A is twice the
length of Line B in the external world, a neurological representation will be isomorphic
(with respect to these types of entities, operations, and relations) if and only if some aspect
of the neurological representation retains the
relationship "twice the magnitude of."
As an animal experiences its environment,
its nervous system forms representations of that
environment. The process is taken to be automatic: No additional reinforcing event is necessary. In fact, "reinforcers" are taken to be
just another aspect of the environment that the
animal represents. Once formed, these representations are stored in the form of mathematical vectors (i.e., ordered strings of numbers).

Gallistel argues (on the basis of considerable
data) that several types of representation are
primitive and/or foundational. A primitive
representation is one that cannot be reduced
to any smaller, more primitive learning process
or combination of such processes. A representation is considered foundational when it can
be used in computations that produce higher
order (secondary and tertiary) representations.
Four types of primitive representations are
proposed: spatial representation (a record of
relative positions of points, lines, and surfaces
in the environment), temporal representation
(a record of the time of observation of environmental events), numerical representation
(a record of the number of events that have
occurred), and representation of the distal aspects of stimuli (records of characteristics such
as reflectance, size, surface area, etc.).
Primary, foundational representations can
be used in computing higher order representations. For example, the primary representation of time of occurrence can be used to
compute a representation of temporal interval
via the operation of subtraction. The learning
of temporal intervals is thus a second-order
learning process. The representation of temporal intervals may be combined with the representation of numerosity to calculate representations of rate. Rate is considered to be a
tertiary representation because the calculations required (number of occurrences divided
by the observation interval) include a secondary representation (temporal interval) as well
as a primary representation (number).
In virtually every case, raw sensory data
must be processed before representations can
be stored. Gallistel thus spends considerable
time discussing the types of calculations necessary to compute various types of representations. Because the types of calculation that
are necessary vary with both sensory modality
and the type of representation, descriptions of
these constitute a set of special theories, relative to the general representational theory. In
some cases, more than one set of calculations
can be potentially effective, and in these cases
Gallistel attempts to clarify the differences.
For example, an animal's nervous system could
represent its position in space by using either
Cartesian or polar coordinates. Following a
lengthy discussion of the calculations required
in each system, Gallistel concludes that a Cartesian coordinate system is preferable because
such a system minimizes error.

BOOK REVIEW
On the surface, it seems that Gallistel is
invoking a "ghost in the machine" that is capable of performing sophisticated calculations-exactly the type of "internal originator" or "autonomous inner man" that Skinner
(1971, 1990, and elsewhere) so vehemently
argued against. Gallistel is careful to note,
however, that no such ghost is required. Even
very complex calculation processes have very
simple analogues when represented in physical
systems. For example, the volume of water in
a bucket is a representation of the integral of
inflow from the garden hose that fills it. The
bucket literally "integrates" the hose with respect to time.
On a more neurological level, Gallistel notes
that transmitter-controlled gene transcription
within a neuron integrates that neuron's stimulation with respect to time. Because gene
transcription results in accumulated biochemical products (proteins), the quantity of protein
within a neuron represents the integral of stimulation with respect to time. Most important
is the fact that transmitter-controlled transcription has been demonstrated within the
nervous system (Greenburg, Ziff, & Greene,
1986). Using such a system, it is theoretically
possible to construct a circuit that represents
spatial position with respect to an arbitrary
origin, using only six neurons (four neurons
whose firing rate is proportional to the organism's velocity in each of the four cardinal directions, plus two neurons that integrate velocity along each of the two principal axes).
Thus, apparently complex mathematical operations can be conducted by very simple physical systems.
The reader will note that, so far, nothing
has been said about behavior. How are these
various representations translated into behavior? It is on this point that Gallistel's theory
is weakest. Gallistel argues that the various
neurological representations are retrieved by
various "readout" mechanisms that serve to
adapt behavior relative to the representation
(and thus relative to the isomorphic environment). He does not elaborate on their nature,
simply stating that "suitable mechanisms may
well be found if a search is made" and further
that such processes "are seldom found (or at
least recognized for what they are) unless they
are looked for" (Gallistel, 1990, p. 595).
Clearly, Gallistel's theory is of a type that
is foreign to most behavior analysts. The theory
is cognitivist and neurological, and makes little

437

contact with behavior. Further, as developed
below, the theory challenges several conceptions that are widely held by behavior analysts.
In each case, however, a careful consideration
of these different ideas may be profitable.

The Role of Theory
Theories-whether neural, mental, or conceptual-talk about intervening steps in ... relationships. But instead of prompting us to search
for and explore relevant variables, they frequently have quite the opposite effect. When
we attribute behavior to a neural or mental
event, real or conceptual, we are likely to forget
that we still have the task of accounting for the
neural or mental event. ... We are likely to
close our eyes to (the problem) and to use the
theory to give us answers in place of answers
we might find through further study. It might
be argued that the principal function of learning theory to date has been, not to suggest appropriate research, but to create a false sense
of security, and unwarranted satisfaction with
the status quo. (Skinner, 1950, p. 194)

Behavior analysts are well schooled in Skinner's admonitions against theory. It is important to note that Skinner's warnings apply primarily to theories that invoke abstract,
unobserved mediational states as explanatory
mechanisms. Physiological theories, when well
grounded in direct observation, are not objectionable (see Skinner, 1984, for clarification of
this point). Because Gallistel's theory is both
cognitivist and neurological, it is difficult to
know if Skinner's admonitions apply. If a distinction must be made, however, Gallistel's
theory resembles a purely cognitivist/mediational theory more than it does a purely physiological theory. Gallistel does devote a whole
chapter to direct physiological evidence, but
the majority of the theory is purely mediational
because the physiological basis is entirely speculative. Therefore, criticisms of cognitivist/
mediational theory apparently do apply.
If behavior analysts want to be (and I would
argue we should be) in touch with substantive
developments in mainstream psychology, they
probably cannot avoid reading mediational
theory altogether. Given this inevitability, behavior analysts are probably more comfortable
with data-driven inductive theories than with
hypothetico-deductive theories that often stray
far from the data. Gallistel's theorizing is, for
the most part, inductive and data driven. In
numerous cases, his theory is developed as fol-
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lows: (a) We know, from extensive data, that
the animal behaves in a particular way. (b)
There are a limited number of ways (and often
only one way) that the animal can solve this
problem, and (c) these solutions require the
animal to respond to certain abstract attributes
of stimuli in certain ways. Thus, (d) the animal's nervous system must be forming and
using representations of those stimuli. The
fourth statement is a logical necessity of the
first three. If the first three statements are true
(about which it is always possible to argue),
then the fourth statement must be true. To
deny this would be to deny that there is a
neurological substrate for behavior (for an
alternative view, see Costall, 1984).
A specific example should illustrate the
point. The desert ant Cataglyphis bicolor lives
underground in a nest that, from the surface
of the desert, is identifiable only by a tiny hole
in the ground (about 1 mm in diameter). As
it forages for food, the ant moves across the
desert in a winding, tortuous path, eventually
traveling up to 100 m from the nest opening.
Upon finding food, the ant turns and orients
directly toward the distant (and visually undetectable) nest. It continues in a straight line
and at a rapid rate until it is very close to the
nest (i.e., within a few meters). How does the
ant do this? There are several possibilities: It
may be following a chemical trace that it laid
down during its outward trip; it may be homing into an auditory or olfactory signal emanating from the nest; it may be "piloting" based
on global landmarks; or it may be using "dead
reckoning," in which it maintains a constant
representation of its position relative to the nest
and computes its homeward course on the basis
of that representation.
These various possibilities may be eliminated experimentally. The first suggestion (retracing its steps by following a chemical trace)
is obviously wrong because the ant does not
retrace its outward path. Several other experiments have demonstrated that the ant is not
using a beacon and is not piloting. For example, if the ant is taken away from its nest
and released a few meters away, it does not
orient directly toward the nest, but instead starts
off in a random direction. In another experiment, ants were captured at a feeding station
and transported to a second (identical) feeding
station some distance away, where they were
released. Ants left the second feeding station

oriented in the direction that the nest would
have been (had they not been displaced) and
continued in a straight line until they were
within 0.5 m of where the nest would have
been. Both experiments clearly rule out the
use of beacons or piloting by global landmarks.
All of the data are consistent with the hypothesis that the ant is exhibiting a dead-reckoning
system, in which it maintains and uses a representation of its spatial position relative to the
nest, a representation that is updated as the
ant moves under its own power but is not
updated when the ant is manually displaced
by the experimenter (note from the above discussion that the neural circuitry required for
such a representational system is actually quite
simple). Gallistel argues that a theory based
on dead reckoning is the only one consistent
with all of the data, and thus argues that animals (at least ants) form and maintain representations of their spatial position. If, as Gallistel asserts, all alternatives have been
considered and eliminated, then his conclusions are correct. Even an ardent behavior analyst should find this type of data-driven, inductive theory interesting, if not compelling.
It can certainly be considered more compelling
than the brands of hypothetico-deductive theorizing more common in cognitivist circles.
In a strange way, such theorizing is quite
consistent with the approach taken by behavior
analysts. A science of behavior seeks to describe
a functional relationship between behavior and
environment, without making reference to
causal entities that exist at different levels of
analysis. The experiments on foraging ants do
exactly that: They describe a functional relationship between the animal's spatial position
and mode of locomotion (environmental variables) and the orientation and distance of its
return trip (behavioral variables). Thus, Gallistel takes higher order invariances between
behavior and environment, functionally analyzed, as the phenomena to be explained. Explanation at the behavioral level is therefore
consistent in many respects with Gallistel's
cognitivist/neurological theory.
A second example will serve to demonstrate
this further. Myerson and Miezin (1980) formulated a familiar quantitative model of behavior in experiments using operant choice
procedures. Gallistel is much taken by the
model, and uses it as a basis for part of his
theory. However, Gallistel notes that

BOOK REVIEW
Myerson and Miezin do not present their model
in the same spirit in which Gibbon, Church,
and Meck present their models of timing and
counting behavior, that is, as a model of the
functional structure for the underlying causative process. Rather, they adopt a "Newtonian"
or "black box" stance. They cast their model
in the form of a set of mathematically formulated inductions about the laws of behavior.
(Gallistel, 1990, p. 369)

Gallistel then goes on to translate the Myerson
and Miezin model, essentially unchanged, into
the language of representational theory. The
ease by which the Myerson and Miezin model
(a good example of a "pure" behavioral model)
can be translated into a representational model
is testimony to the fact that Gallistel's cognitivist/representational approach and the traditional behavioral approach are, in fact, parallel explanations of the same phenomena.
The next question, obviously, is "Why
bother?" Skinner's points against theorizing
are well taken. If behavioral and cognitivist/
neurological approaches really offer parallel
explanations of the same phenomena, what is
gained by complex theorizing? A commonly
offered answer is that theories can serve as a
heuristic by which new research ideas are generated. By thinking in different ways about
learning, we might conduct interesting experiments that otherwise might not have been conducted. This has already occurred in the area
of matching. Gallistel's cognitivist/representational theory of matching has led him to
conduct a series of extremely interesting
matching experiments-experiments that have
revealed important and surprising results
(Mark & Gallistel, 1994). It is not possible to
know whether these experiments would ever
have been conducted in the absence of Gallistel's theory. What is clear is that theory-driven
research can produce data that are not only
relevant to behavior analysis but also provide
a starting place for new behavioral analyses.
The danger lies in the fact that theory-driven
research may be wasteful because it is often
interesting only within the context of the theory that produced it. Skinner (1950) warned
of this problem, which probably contributed
to the ultimate downfall of the Hullian system
(see Bolles, 1975, for an interesting discussion). A solution is to design experiments that
will produce interesting empirical findings, regardless of the theory behind them. Although
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this may be easier said than done, Gallistel's
recent matching work seems to have accomplished the task. The empirical results he has
reported will remain of interest regardless of
the ultimate fate of his theory.
In summary, Gallistel's approach uses a type
of mediational theory that is foreign to most
behavior analysts. The theory is inductive and
data driven, however, and translation into behavioral terms is quite possible. A behavior
analyst will do well to become familiar with
experiments addressing such theories, which,
if nothing else, can lead to new and interesting
directions for behavioral analysis.

The Scope and Definition of Learning
I wish to point out here simply that the observed
data are merely changes in the strength of a
reflex. As such they have no dimensions which
distinguish them from changes in strength taking place during fatigue, facilitation, inhibition,
or ... changes in drive, emotion, and so on.
The process of conditioning is distinguished by
what is done to the organism to induce the
change. (Skinner, 1938, p. 19)

Learning is intimately connected to computational machinery that extracts information with
a particular formal structure from particular
sensory inputs, independent of the immediate
utility the information may have and independent of the uses to which it may subsequently
be put by diverse readout mechanisms.... The
task in the analysis of learning is to figure out
what is being extracted and stored-what it is
about the external world that is represented by
the stored code-and how this information is
extracted-what kinds of computations are
performed. (Gallistel, 1990, p. 88)

In a recent conversation, a colleague criticized The Organization ofLearning because "it
really doesn't have anything to do with learning." A reasonable criticism? Perhaps, depending upon one's definition of learning, and
one's willingness to stretch that definition.
Skinner (1938) described two dynamic laws
of conditioning, and ever since that time the
behavioral analysis of learning has concentrated almost exclusively on operant and classical conditioning, with a heavy emphasis on
the former. The Organization of Learning certainly concentrates on other things. In a book
that is close to 600 pages in length, operant
and classical conditioning are not even considered until page 351 . When they are considered,
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the treatment is relatively brief (just over 100
pages). Thus, a book claiming to be about
learning dedicates only a about one sixth of its
space to the topics that, to most behavior analysts, constitute the core of learning theory.
Instead of operant and classical conditioning, Gallistel chooses to emphasize what he
considers to be the primary and foundational
learning processes, processes that result in the
representation of space, time, and numerosity.
In fact, over half of the book is dedicated to
these topics. Operant and classical conditioning receive less attention because they are based
on the representation of rate, which, as discussed earlier, is taken to be a secondary or
tertiary representation. Gallistel's deemphasis
of operant and classical conditioning, therefore, is entirely consistent with his theoretical
viewpoint.
The differences are deeper than a matter of
emphasis, however. Gallistel offers a definition
of learning that is fundamentally different from
the definition to which behavior analysts are
accustomed. In a Skinnerian system, "learning" or "conditioning" is defined empirically
as a correlation between (as Skinner notes in
the quote above) changes in reflex strength and
the operations that produced that change.
Learning exists entirely at the behavioral level,
because the operations and observations that
define learning are found at the behavioral
level. In Gallistel's system, learning is the formation of representations. It occurs at the neurological level and need not be expressed at
the behavioral level. Although changes in behavior must, of course, reflect the underlying
neurological changes, learning is clearly something that occurs somewhere else, at some other
level of analysis. Gallistel's failure to specify
the nature of "readout" mechanisms exacerbates the problem, making it virtually impossible to predict how changes in representations
will be reflected in behavior.
Despite such major differences in both emphasis and definition, Gallistel spends relatively little time discussing the relationship between his views and those of traditional
behavioral analysis. When he does so, it is in
a curious and almost self-contradictory way.
In the process of developing his views on
matching, Gallistel states that matching data
(particularly data from Neuringer, 1967) "call
attention to the shortcomings of a Skinnerian
analysis of learning phenomena" (Gallistel,

1990, p. 364). This is particularly curious because it comes just a few pages before his very
positive discussion of the Myerson and Miezin
(1980) model that, as a "black box" approach,
is fairly close to a true Skinnerian model.
The difficulty arises because Gallistel is confused over just what constitutes a Skinnerian
analysis of learning, although his confusion is
perhaps shared by a considerable number of
behavior analysts. Apparently, Gallistel considers a Skinnerian analysis to be one in which
reinforcement plays the primary (and perhaps
only) causal role and in which rate of response
is the primary (and perhaps only) dependent
measure of interest. Such a position does not
constitute a behavioral analysis. Behavioral
analysis seeks the empirical description of
functional relationships between environmental variables and behavioral variables. "Reinforcement" plays a fundamental role in a
behavioral analysis of learning only to the extent that empirically defined reinforcers stand
in an orderly functional relationship with behavior. Likewise, rate of response plays a fundamental role only to the extent that it varies
in an orderly way as a function of environmental variables.
It is easy to understand the source of Gallistel's confusion, because it is easy to forget
that Skinner initially proposed to "sketch what
seems to me the most convenient formulation
of the data at the present time" (Skinner, 1938,
p. 5, emphasis mine). It is easy to forget because experiments examining various effects
of reinforcement on response rate have dominated behavior analysis (although there is a
trend in choice studies to treat rate in relative
rather than absolute terms). It is easy to forget
because in some of Skinner's own writings (e.g.,
Skinner, 1948) he seems to force a reinforcement analysis where other analyses might be
more cogent. It is important for the behavior
analyst to remember that the dominance of
reinforcement and response rate is a matter of
emphasis, justifiable only on empirical grounds.
To believe otherwise is to be as dogmatic as
the theoretical viewpoints behavior analysts
have criticized as rigid.
Returning to Gallistel's analysis of matching, is he justified to reject a "Skinnerian"
reinforcement analysis on empirical grounds?
Gallistel's argument is based on data from
Neuringer (1967) that show an inverse relationship between schedule preference and re-
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inforcer probability, as well as on studies of
choice on concurrent ratio schedules (Herrnstein & Loveland, 1975). Gallistel suggests as
an alternative that the controlling variable in
matching paradigms is not reinforcement but
the observed (and hence internally represented)
density of food. Gallistel is certainly correct
that such data challenge the early empirical
notions of reinforcers as universal strengtheners of behavior (Meehl, 1950; Skinner,
1938). However, more recent behavioral models (e.g., Baum, 1973; Herrnstein & Vaughan,
1980; Hinson & Staddon, 1983; Timberlake
& Allison, 1974) have dealt with this problem
while retaining the concept of reinforcement.
Thus, at least for now, reinforcement remains
an empirically justifiable concept. Nevertheless, it is probably worthwhile to consider Gallistel's alternative.
Unlike his treatment of "Skinnerian" analysis, Gallistel devotes many pages to an attack
of traditional associative theory.-This should
bother behavior analysts little because associative theory is not particularly Skinnerian
(see Williams, 1987), and Gallistel does not
identify it as such. Most of Gallistel's argument should be familiar to behavior analysts:
A variety of phenomena (blocking, overshadowing, background conditioning, latent inhibition,
conditioned taste aversion, intertrial-interval
effects, etc.) are inconsistent with simple conditioning models in which pairing of the conditional stimulus and the unconditional stimulus results in the formation of an associative
link. As an alternative, Gallistel offers a nonassociative representational model that has the
admirable characteristic of providing good fits
to the data without the use of free parameters.
Gallistel's model of classical conditioning has
some important implications for recent cellular/molecular models of learning (e.g., Gluck
& Thompson, 1987; Hawkins & Kandel,
1984). Gallistel notes that these models are
almost universally based on premodern concepts of association. If Gallistel is correct, and
molecular theorists do not change their course,
the so-called "decade of the brain" (see Cacioppo & Berntson, 1992) will end without
any significant progress in identifying the neural substrate of learning.
In summary, Gallistel's views on the scope
and definition of learning are quite different
from those normally held by behavior analysts.
Does this mean that behavior analysts should
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sell their pigeon boxes and begin studying dead
reckoning in invertebrates? Certainly not. The
behavior analyst is wise to remember, however, that the field's emphasis on reinforcement
is justifiable on empirical grounds alone. There
may exist other empirically reliable forms of
learning that have nothing to do with reinforcement, and the behavior analyst would do
well to educate him- or herself in these literatures. Gallistel's book can be an important
component of that education.

On Comparative Psychology and
General Laws
We begin by choosing an organism-one which
we hope will be representative but which is
first merely convenient. (Skinner, 1957, p. 343)
Similarly, when it comes to learning, we must
expect to find different organs of learning (different computational mechanisms) for such
fundamentally different problems as the problem of representing the structure of three-dimensional space and the problem of representing time and temporal intervals. Within one
problem domain, we may expect to find only a
few basic types of learning mechanism, with
interesting variations that adapt a common basic solution to the spectrum of demands peculiar
to a given species. (Gallistel, 1990, p. 582)

I have taken an informal survey of my colleagues over the past several years, and I think
I have identified two subpopulations. The survey has only one question: Why do you study
animal behavior? There are generally only two
answers: One group (of which I consider myself a member) responds, somewhat defensively, "because I am interested in animal behavior!" A second group responds (a bit less
defensively, perhaps), "because animals provide a model system through which I can understand human behavior." These two groups
will, I suspect, have different reactions to The
Organization of Learning. The first group will
find it fascinating, the second might not. There
are several reasons for this.
The first reason is based on emphasis and
coverage. Virtually the entire book is based on
the study of nonhuman animal behavior. On
the rare occasions when Gallistel discusses data
from human subjects, he seems almost apologetic (e.g., p. 528). The emphasis on animal
behavior makes the book a gold mine for those
whose primary interest is in animals. Many
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of the topics come from biological literatures
that a behavior analyst might seldom contact,
giving the book a certain exotic flair. These
topics include (to name a few) dead reckoning
in ants, geese, and gerbils; sun-compass orientation in bees; stellar orientation in indigo
buntings; distance estimation in insects, gerbils, chameleons, and toads; homing in pigeons
and bats; ideal-free foraging in ducks; circadian foraging patterns in bees; the nursing behavior of hares; and echolocation in bats. At
times, the book reads like a nature documentary, with each page revealing new and fascinating facts about the wonderful diversity of
animal behavior.
Those behavior analysts who study animals
as models of human behavior may find The
Organization ofLearning less satisfying. Much
of the material simply does not apply to humans. A discussion of dead reckoning in ants
might be viewed as intellectually interesting,
but it might also be difficult to get excited about
a type of problem that humans are notoriously
poor at solving.
The behavior analyst who is primarily interested in animal models will also have other,
more fundamental problems with Gallistel's
book. Simply stated, Gallistel's theory implies
that there may be no general laws of learning
at the behavioral level. As developed above, Gallistel's theory places learning at the representational level; indeed, Gallistel argues that animals represent their environments in
fundamentally similar ways (i.e., as mathematical vectors). However, such generalities
necessarily exist at the neural level but do not
necessarily exist at the behavioral level. The
behavioral expression of learning is based in
part on the way in which sensory and neural
systems calculate quantities for representation,
which in turn is a product of the type of stimuli
the animal is likely to experience. Likewise,
the behavioral expression of learning is based
on the way in which specific (but as yet unspecified) readout mechanisms retrieve representations and adapt behavior. These readout mechanisms are also assumed to be a
function of the type of environment in which
the animal exists. The resulting implication is
that generalities need not exist at the behavioral level. If these generalities do exist (and
Gallistel argues that in some cases they probably do), they are the product of fortuitous
evolutionary forces but are not necessitated by
the general theory.

The debate over general laws of learning
has a long and familiar history within behavior
analysis, and behavior analysts have taken a
fair amount of criticism (some justified, some
not) for a failure to recognize species differences (e.g., Breland & Breland, 1961; Hall,
1987; Schwartz, 1989; Timberlake & Lucas,
1989). Despite some proclamations to the contrary, it is probably safe to say that many behavior analysts at least hope (and many fervently believe) that there are general behavioral
laws of learning that apply, in a relatively
universal way, across animal species.
Gallistel's thesis challenges a belief in general behavioral laws. What are the implications for behavior analysis if he is correct? At
the most basic level, there are none. The question of whether laws of learning apply across
species is entirely empirical, and there is no
theoretical reason for the behavior analyst to
believe or not to believe in such general laws.
There is nothing fundamental in behavior
analysis that predicts that general laws exist,
just as there is nothing fundamental in behavior analysis that predicts that general laws do
not exist. Skinner recognized that his initial
choice of subjects was merely convenient and
only hopefully representative, but this point is
often forgotten.
At another level, however, Gallistel's thesis
has strong implications for behavior analysis.
If there are no general laws of learning, how
do those of us who study animal behavior justify our activities to ourselves and to others?
Those of us who study animal behavior primarily out of personal interest have no trouble
with self-justification. But on what basis can
we ethically claim scarce resources like faculty
lines and grant funds? How can we confront
the threat from the animal rights movement if
humans stand to benefit little from behavioral
research on animals?
These are difficult questions for which there
are no obvious answers. Gallistel's thesis challenges us to consider the questions, and it is a
good thing that we do. It is imperative that we
consider such questions and formulate good
answers. The future of the field may depend
on it.

Different Questions, Different Answers
As in all sciences, both laboratory practices and
concepts and principles need to be constantly
examined, but I see no point in arguing with
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those who want to do things in a different way.
(Skinner, 1987, p. 12)
Because of its similarity to the vernacular, cognitive psychology was easy to understand and
the so-called cognitive revolution was for a time
successful. That may have accelerated the speed
with which behavior analysts drew away from
the psychological establishment, founding their
own associations, holding their own meetings,
publishing their own journals. They were accused of building their own ghetto, but they
were simply accepting the fact that they had
little to gain from the study of a creative mind.
(Skinner, 1990, p. 1210)

Cognitivism is not behavioral and behaviorism is not cognitive (Schnaitter, 1987). Each
approach asks its own questions and gets its
own answers, with little or no required interaction with the other camp. A comparison of
Gallistel's The Organization of Learning with
traditional behavior analysis demonstrates the
point nicely. Gallistel asks fundamentally different questions and gets fundamentally different answers. Gallistel is concerned with describing the nature of representations of the
environment, whereas behavior analysts are
concerned with describing functional relationships between behavior and environment. Although translations between the systems are
clearly possible, each system could easily exist
independent of the other.
The critical question is how to react to this
difference. There are at least two possible
strategies. One strategy, apparently that advocated by Skinner in his later years, is isolationism. Although the majority of behavior
analysts are probably not isolationists, there is
a substantial and vocal group representing this
position (see also Coleman & Mehlman, 1992).
Behavior analysts already represent a minority
faction within psychology, but with our own
journals, associations, and meetings, it really
doesn't seem so lonely. A continued move toward intellectual isolation might not even be
a noticeable difference. Behavior analysts
choosing this route need not bother reading
Gallistel's book.
Intellectual isolationism has its negative
consequences, however. Intellectual isolationism breeds intellectual stagnation. If we surround ourselves with yes-persons, we can soon
become so comfortable with our beliefs that
we stagnate. We bask in "an orgy of self-

adulation" (Nevin, 1991, p. 35) while we simultaneously cease to reevaluate. We cease to
see creative solutions to problems because such
solutions lie far outside our "mind-set." History shows us that homogeneity of thought
inspires little progress, and isolationism could
take behavior analysis into a new and darker
age.
An alternative, also advocated by a large
(but perhaps less vocal) group, is to view the
present as an opportunity for a new liberalism.
Rather than reflexively isolating him- or herself from new ideas, the behavior analyst could
look at those new ideas without rigid precommitments. This is not to abandon the fundamental principles of behavior analysis; rather,
it is to develop, as Neuringer (1991) suggests,
a new sense of humility. It is to allow ourselves
the intellectual challenge of considering ideas
on their own merits instead of dogmatically
and reflexively rejecting those ideas as "creation science." It is to choose a path toward
intellectual growth.
Those behavior analysts who are interested
in pursuing this more liberal path will find
The Organization of Learning fascinating and
intellectually stimulating, whether or not they
find all of its steps to be in the right direction.
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